Most economies experience episodes of persistent real exchange rate appreciations, when the question arises whether there is a need for intervention to protect the export sector. In this paper we present a model of irreversible destruction where exchange rate intervention may be justified if the export sector is financially constrained. However the criterion for intervention is not whether there are bankruptcies or not, but whether these can cause a large exchange rate overshooting once the factors behind the appreciation subside. The optimal policy includes ex-ante and ex-post interventions. Ex-ante (i.e., during the appreciation phase) interventions have limited effects if the financial resources in the export sector are relatively abundant. In this case the bulk of the intervention takes place ex-post, and is concentrated in the first period of the depreciation phase. In contrast, if the financial constraint in the export sector is tight, the policy is shifted toward ex-ante intervention and it is optimal to lean against the appreciation. JEL Codes: E0, E2, F0, F4, H2.
Introduction
Most economies experience episodes of large real exchange rate appreciations. There are many factors with the potential to fuel these appreciations. For example, they can stem from domestic policies aimed at taming a stubborn inflationary episode, from the absorption of large capital inflows caused by domestic and external factors, from exchange rate interventions in trading partners, from domestic consumption booms, from a sharp rise in terms of trade in commodity producing economies or, in its most extreme form, from the discovery of large natural resources wealth (the so-called Dutch disease).
While there are idiosyncrasies in each of these instances, the common policy element is that, when the appreciation is persistent enough, the question arises whether there is a need for intervention to protect the export sector (often referred as "competitiveness" policies). This widespread concern goes beyond the purely distributional aspects associated to real appreciations. The fear is that somehow the medium and long run health of the economy is compromised by these episodes.
If this concern is justified, should policy makers intervene and stabilize the exchange rate before it is too late? More generally, what does the optimal policy look like?
In this paper we propose a framework to address this common policy element. We present a dynamic model of entry and exit in the export sector where entrepreneurs face financial constraints and exchange rate stabilization may be justified. In our model, when financial constraints damage the export sector's ability to recover, the economy experiences a large exchange rate overshooting once the factors behind the appreciation subside and nontradable demand contracts.
Although not always present, overshooting episodes are pervasive, especially when financial frictions are widespread. Figure 1 illustrates three recent examples: The Finnish, Mexican and Asian episodes of the early 1990s, mid 1990s, and late 1990s, respectively. In each of them, the pattern is one where the appreciation is followed by a depreciation of the real exchange rate that significantly overshoots its new medium term level. 1 In our model, the overshooting results from the export sector's inability to absorb the resources (labor) freed from the contraction in nontradable demand. This inability leads to an amplified fall in real wages, which is costly to consumer-workers. 2 There is scope for policy intervention because 1 The figure shows real exchange rate indices normalized to 100 at date 0. The latter corresponds to June 1997 for the Asian Crisis, November 1994 for Mexico, and October 1991 for Finland. The Asian crisis real exchange rate is a simple average of the indices for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. Data Source: IFS (Effective Real Exchange Rate) for Finland, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. Real Exchange Rate from Hausmann et al (2006) for Mexico, Korea and Thailand. 2 In practice, the drop in the relative price of nontradables and real wages often takes the form of a sharp nominal depreciation which is not matched by a rise in the nominal price of nontradables and wages. See, e.g., Goldfajn and
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Asian Crisis Mexico Finland there is a connection between the severity of the overshooting and the extent of the contraction in the export sector during the preceding appreciation phase. If consumers were to reduce their demand for nontradables in this phase, then there would be less destruction ex-ante and a faster recovery ex-post. However, rational atomistic consumers ignore the effect of their individual decisions during the appreciation phase on the extent of the overshooting during the depreciation phase. It is this pecuniary externality that justifies and informs policy intervention in our framework.
Our analysis has two parts, a positive one and a normative one. The former consists of a dynamic model of factor reallocation in the presence of financial constraints. Our model economy starts by transiting into an appreciation phase, which it exits into a depreciation phase with a Poisson probability. There are several regions of interest, indexed by the financial resources of the export sector at the onset of the appreciation. When financial resources are plentiful, the economy reaches the first best as real exchange rates (and real wages) are pinned down by purely technological free entry and exit conditions, and hence are orthogonal to consumers' actions. At lower levels of financial resources, financial constraints may become binding during the appreciation phase, the depreciation phase, or both. If they are only binding during the appreciation phase, then the economy experiences bankruptcies but the recovery of the export sector is swift once the depreciation phase starts and the exchange rate is again pinned down by purely technological factors. In contrast, if the financial constraint is binding during the depreciation phase, the recovery of the export sector is slow and the initial real depreciation overshoots the long run depreciation.
On the normative side, we consider the optimal intervention of a benevolent planner that seeks to maximize consumers' welfare, subject to not worsening entrepreneur' welfare. The planner faces the same financial constraint present in the private economy. This limits the planner's instruments, as it rules out direct transfers across groups. Instead, we focus on market-mediated transfers implemented through interventions that influence the real exchange rate. That is, interventions that affect consumers' choices and, thus, the entrepreneurial sector through their effect on equilibrium prices. From this perspective, we show that consumers gain from stabilizing the appreciation whenever this leads to a faster recovery of the export sector once the appreciation subsides. The gain derives from the increase in real wages associated to a faster reconstruction of the export sector.
Importantly, even when overshooting is expected, intertemporal consumption allocation considerations put limits on how much intervention is desirable during the appreciation phase. This connects our analysis to a central consideration for policy makers when dealing with an asset appreciation, be it the currency, real estate or any other asset with potential macroeconomic implications: If there is a need for intervention, how much should be done as prevention (ex-ante) and how much should be left for after "the crash" (ex-post)? In our framework, the answer to this question depends primarily on the extent of the financial constraint in the export sector. On one end, when the financial constraint is severe, ex-ante intervention is most effective. On the other end, when the constraint is loose, ex-post intervention is most desirable and effective. In general, the optimal policy has elements of both, ex-ante and ex-post intervention.
The approach to optimal policy proposed in this paper resembles that of the literature on dynamic optimal taxation. In this dimension, the main innovation of the paper is to apply this methodology to an environment where a subset of agents are financially constrained, imposing restrictions on the ability of policy to reallocate resources between these agents and the rest of the economy. This approach and the solution method developed should prove useful outside our particular application. Since this paper was first written, 3 there has been a flourishing literature on the role of pecuniary externalities in international capital flows, e.g., Korinek and Jeanne (2010) and Bianchi (2011). 4 Some of the themes of this literature are common to our paper, in particular, the idea that a boom in international borrowing can sow the seeds of a deeper downturn in the events of a capital flow reversal and the idea that adjustments in relative prices can be associated to pecuniary externalities and thus to inefficiencies. However, the channel explored here is different from the collateral channel emphasized in most of these papers. Here we look at the effects that a credit boom has on tradable firms through its effect on non-tradable input prices, namely, domestic real wages. So we have a direct effect of the appreciation on exporters' accumulation of internal funds, an effect that is at work even for firms that have little access to outside capital (for which the collateral channel is likely to be less relevant) and so may be especially important for developing economies. Two recent papers are more closely related to the specific mechanisms explored here.
Itskhoki and Moll (2014) feature a pecuniary externality based on the effect of real wages on the accumulation of internal funds by constrained entrepreneurs. The pecuniary externality is very similar to the one developed here, but they explore its effects on the transitional dynamics of a growing economy, while our paper focuses on its effects in a boom-bust cycle. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2014) study a boom-bust cycle, with a real appreciation and real wage growth in the boom.
However, they introduce nominal wage rigidities and a fixed exchange rate in their model. Therefore, the effects of the bust are in terms of unemployment, rather than in terms of depressed wages as in our model. 3 The NBER Working Paper was circulated in 2007. 4 See the review of Korinek (2011) in a previous issue of this journal.
In terms of policy instruments, many recent papers have concentrated attention on taxes and subsidies on foreign borrowing and lending, thus providing a welfare rationale for capital controls. In our paper, we give our planner a wider scope for intervention, allowing for differential taxation of tradable and non-tradable goods. However, the crucial mechanism in our paper is inter-temporal, and it would be easy to extend our analysis to a setup where the planner is only allowed to use capital controls.
A number of recent papers have also explored the relative merits of ex ante versus ex post interventions in boom-bust episodes, in particular, Jeanne and Korinek (2013) and Benigno, Chen, Otrok, Rebucci and Young (2013). The latter argue that when the government is allowed to use plausible corrective policies during the bust, the need for corrective ex ante policies is reduced or even absent. As discussed above, our paper allows the planner a fairly wide scope for intervention and we show that, depending on initial conditions, ex ante and ex post interventions may both be part of an optimally designed intervention.
In terms of its mechanism, the paper also belongs to the literature on the so called Dutch disease. There, intervention is justified by the presence of dynamic technological externalities through learning-by-doing (e.g., van Wijnbergen 1984 , Corden 1984 , and Krugman 1987 ). In contrast, our paper highlights financial frictions and the pecuniary externalities that stem from these.
The policy implications of these two approaches are different: While learning-by-doing offers a justification for industrial policies as a development strategy, the financial frictions we highlight have intertemporal reallocation implications of the sort that matter for business cycle policies.
Section 2 presents a stylized model of creative destruction over appreciation and depreciation cycles. Section 3 characterizes optimal exchange rate intervention in such setup. Section 4 discusses different extensions and their impact on optimal policy. Section 5 concludes and is followed by an extensive appendix, containing all the proofs.
A Simple Model of a Destructive Appreciation and Overshooting
In this section we present a model of an economy experiencing a temporary, but persistent, real appreciation. The export sector faces large sunk costs of investment, which limit the extent of its desired contraction, in order to keep capital operational and preserve the option to produce once the appreciation is over. However, this waiting strategy generates losses that require financing.
If this financing is limited, the export sector experiences a larger contraction than desired. From the point of view of the economy as a whole, these excessive contractions may compromise the recovery of the export sector once the appreciation is over, leading to a prolonged period of deep real depreciation and low wages.
The Environment
There are two groups of agents in the domestic economy, each of unit mass: consumers and entrepreneurs (exporters). There are two consumption goods: a tradable and a nontradable good.
The consumer supplies inelastically one unit of labor each period, which can be used as an input for the production of tradables or nontradables. In both cases, one unit of labor is needed to produce one unit of output. In addition, the production of tradables requires one unit of capital, or an "export unit," i.e., the technology of the tradable sector is Leontief in labor and capital. Creating an export unit requires f units of tradable goods. After an export unit has been set up, it needs to be maintained in operation, otherwise it is irreversibly shut down. Entrepreneurs are the only agents that have access to the technology to run and maintain export units. At date 0 they begin with k −1 open export units. The markets for tradables, nontradables and labor are competitive.
The assumption that nontradable production only requires labor, with no adjustment costs, is made for two reasons. The first is simplicity, given that our focus is on the effect of appreciation episodes on the destruction of productive capacity in the tradable sector. The second is that it captures the fact that export oriented firms often have more specific (sunk) capital than firms producing primarily for domestic markets (see Buera et al., 2008) . Later in the paper we discuss the effect of introducing capital and adjustment costs in the nontradable sector. 
and transition probability π (θ t+1 |θ t ). The economy begins in the "appreciation" state θ 0 = θ A . Each period, with probability π (θ D |θ A ) = δ, the economy switches to the "depreciation" state.
Once the latter transition takes place, the state θ D is an absorbing state, i.e., π (θ A |θ D ) = 0. In the appreciation state the taste shock drives up consumers' demand for both tradable and nontradables, putting upward pressure on the real exchange rate (since the supply of tradables is fully elastic while that of tradables is not -see below). In reality, increases in consumption demand are usually due to positive wealth shocks, e.g., an improvement in the terms of trade for a commodity producing country, or to external shocks which generate positive capital inflows. The taste shock is a convenient device to introduce a shift in consumption demand with minimal added complications and without adding other frictions. We will return to this issue later in the paper, once we have developed our main points.
Let θ t ≡ θ 0 , ..., θ t denote the history of the economy up to date t. Note that our simple Markov chain yields histories that are limited to a sequence of θ A 's followed by a sequence of θ D 's.
Both consumers and entrepreneurs have access to the international capital market, where they can trade a full set of state contingent securities. On each date t, agents trade one-period statecontingent securities that pay one unit of tradable good in period t + 1 if θ t+1 is equal to either θ A or θ D . The entrepreneurs holdings of these securities at time t are denoted by a(θ t+1 ). All entrepreneurs begin with an initial financial position a 0 . For consumers, we set it to zero without loss of generality. Consumers face no financial constraints, while entrepreneurs face the financial
That is, entrepreneurs cannot commit to make any positive repayment at future dates. This is a simple form of financial markets imperfection, which captures the idea that entrepreneurs have limited access to external finance. This is the only friction we introduce in the model.
The rest of the world is captured by a representative consumer with a large endowment of tradable goods and linear preferences represented by E ∑ ∞ t=0 β t c T, * t . Therefore asset pricing is risk neutral: at date t, the price of a security paying one unit of tradable in state θ t+1 is βπ (θ t+1 |θ t ).
Decisions and Equilibrium
Let p θ t denote the price of the nontradable good in terms of units of tradable (the numeraire), or the real exchange rate (definedà la IMF). Given the linear technology in the nontradable sector, the equilibrium wage in terms of tradables must be equal to this price. Consumers and entrepreneurs take the real exchange rate as given. Equilibrium prices and quantities are functions of the whole history θ t . To save on notation, whenever confusion is not possible we only use the time subindex t, e.g., p t is shorthand for p θ t .
Consumers
Since wages are equal to p t , markets are complete, and intertemporal prices are pinned down by the world capital market, consumers face the single intertemporal budget constraint
where π θ t denotes the ex ante probability of history θ t . Thus, consumers' demand for tradables and nontradables take the simple form:
where κ is a normalized measure of consumers' wealth and is equal to
There are two important features from the consumption block. First, during A periods the demand curve for nontradables shifts upward. This is the source of the appreciation. Second, κ is endogenous and is increasing in the value of the exchange rate at any future date. The latter feature will be essential in the analysis of optimal policy.
Exporters and Equilibrium
Even though consumption volatility is not the result of any friction, it may create problems for both firms and consumers, if the export sector has limited financial resources. Before discussing this issue in detail, we need to understand exporters' decisions.
It is useful to separate the entrepreneurs' decisions regarding consumption and investment from the problem of creating new units. To this end, we assume that there is a competitive adjustment sector that creates and destroys export units and makes zero profits. Let q t denote the price of an export unit. Equilibrium in the adjustment sector requires that
That is, if units are being created their price must be equal to the creation cost f , while if they are being destroyed their price must be zero.
The entrepreneur's flow of funds constraint can then be written as
Each period, the entrepreneur uses his current profits, (1 − p t ) k t , and his financial wealth, a t , to finance consumption, investment in new export units, and investment in state contingent securities. Notice that our timing assumption is that production units created at date t are immediately productive, i.e., they immediately generate profits of 1 − p t per unit. The entrepreneur chooses sequences for c T,e θ t , k θ t , and a θ t to maximize his expected utility, subject to the flow of funds constraint (7) and the financial constraint (1) for each history θ t .
Using recursive notation, let V a, k − ; θ t denote the expected utility of an entrepreneur in state θ t who is holding a units of cash and k − production units. Then we can write the Bellman equation:
It is straightforward to setup the entrepreneur's problem in sequential form and argue directly that the value function is linear in a and k − , given that both the objective function and the constraints are linear. 5 Moreover, a and k − only appear in the flow of funds constraint (7), in the form a + q θ t k − . It follows that the value function takes the form
where φ θ t represents the marginal return on entrepreneurs' wealth, which, by the envelope theorem is equal to the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint.
In each period, the entrepreneur chooses how many production units to operate, how much to consume, and how many contingent claims to purchase. Therefore, the first order conditions and complementary slackness conditions with respect to these choice variables are (going back to sequential notation)
The first condition states that the opportunity cost of the resources used in keeping the marginal unit in operation must be equal to the expected value of that unit tomorrow, as long as some units are kept active. The cost of keeping a unit in operation corresponds to the price of acquiring that unit, q t , minus the current profits, 1 − p t .
Remember that an open unit must remain active, so if p t > 1 the firm is making current losses and these losses add to the cost of keeping the unit open.
The second condition states that if the entrepreneur's consumption is positive, the marginal value of wealth must be equal to one. Otherwise, it can exceed one. The third condition says that the marginal value of wealth must be non-increasing between two consecutive histories. Holdings of financial assets can only be positive between two histories where the marginal value of wealth is constant.
Finally, we are in a position to define a competitive equilibrium.
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium is given by a sequence of prices p θ t , q θ t and quantities
optimal; (ii) the entrepreneur's decisions c T,e θ t , k θ t , a θ t are optimal; (iii) the sequences k θ t and q θ t satisfy (4)- (6); (iv) the labor market clears for each θ t ,
The Appreciation and Depreciation Phases
Recall that our economy starts with a stock of export units, k −1 , and has just entered state A. The situation that concerns us is one in which there is destruction of units during the appreciation, and creation during the depreciation. Moreover, we also wish to focus on a scenario where the option to wait is sufficiently positive that it is not optimal to destroy all export units during the appreciation.
An Efficient Benchmark
The export sector has financial resources a 0 to finance the losses during the appreciation phase.
As a benchmark, let us first study a case where a 0 is sufficiently large that financial constraints are never binding. In this benchmark, there is no need to keep track of the history θ t except for the current state θ t , since, as we will see, equilibrium prices and quantities are constant both in the A and in the D phase. 6 Therefore, with a slight abuse of notation, we will simply index variables 6 Formally, by "A phase" we mean all the histories of the form θ t = θ A , ..., θ A . By "D phase" all those of the form
using A or D.
In the absence of financial constraints, φ θ t is constant and equal to one in both phases. We show later that in equilibrium there is destruction when the economy enters phase A, and creation when it switches to D. Correspondingly, q A = 0 and q D = f . It follows that the first order conditions for k in the A and D phases, respectively, reduce to:
which fully determine the real exchange rate in each phase:
We assume that
ensuring that creation is profitable in the D phase and that p f b D > 0. Given these prices we can find the consumption of tradables and nontradables in each state:
where κ f b is equal to:
.
Market clearing yields the number of units open in each state:
It is now easy to see that the following two assumptions guarantee that there is destruction when the economy enters state A at date 0, and that there is positive creation when the economy shifts from A to D:
Notice that, as long as the preference shock θ A is sufficiently large, the equilibrium prices are fully determined on the supply side of the model, by (12) and (13) . In particular, the price during During the A phase, it is optimal for the economy to accommodate the increased demand for nontradables by contracting the export sector temporarily. However, since shutting down units wastes creation costs, it is also optimal for the export sector to keep k (12), (13), and (14) . The marginal value of entrepreneurial wealth, φ θ t , is constant and equal to 1. 
as conventional initial conditions. These initial conditions arise if the economy makes an unexpected transition from the D state to the A state in period 0. We plot an appreciation lasting 5 periods, since that is its expected duration when
The Constrained Economy and Overshooting
Suppose now that a 0 is not large enough to implement the first best path (i.e., a 0 <â f b ). There are two margins through which this deficit can materialize. First, the export sector may not have enough resources to finance the flow of losses (p Relative to the benchmark case, we now need to keep track not only of the current exogenous state θ t , but also of the number of periods since the D phase started. The reason for this is that in this case there is a gradual transition in the D phase where the export sector rebuilds and is constrained by limited financial resources. At the same time, due to complete markets the A phase is still stationary, with constant prices and quantities. The next proposition summarizes the properties of equilibrium prices and quantities that will be useful in the following characterization.
Proposition 2 If a 0 <â f b then p θ t , k θ t , and a θ t are constant in the A phase. In the D phase, p θ t , k θ t , and a θ t only depend on the number of periods that the economy has spent in D. The price q θ t is equal to zero in the A phase and to f in the D phase.
This proposition allows us to write p θ t = p A in the A phase and p θ t = p D,j in the D phase, where j is the number of periods the economy has spent in D. Analogous notation is used for k θ t , a θ t and φ θ t .
Let us focus on the A phase. The relevant optimality conditions for the entrepreneur are
and
The stationarity of entrepreneurial wealth in A implies that a A = a 0 and the budget constraint (7) can be written as 8
The flow generated by the initial resources a 0 can be used to finance the operational losses of the export units that remain open during the appreciation, and to transfer financial resources to the recovery phase in D. Going back to the first order conditions, the complementary inequalities in The first order condition for k A (equation (15)) yields an expression for the real exchange rate in the A region:
where the inequality comes from (16) . As in the benchmark case, the appreciation is such that production units incur losses, as p A > 1. When a D,0 > 0 the real exchange rate is equal to that in the first-best, and entrepreneurs are indifferent between holding state contingent securities or holding production units. This indifference means that these two assets have the same expected return, which pins down the equilibrium exchange rate as in the unconstrained economy. Instead, when a D,0 = 0, the expected return on export units is larger than that on state contingent securities. This wedge is possible because only entrepreneurs can purchase export units, and they are financially constrained. This depresses the exchange rate to a p A smaller than p f b
A . Far from being good news, this smaller appreciation reflects the fact that financially constrained firms are unable to keep open as many production units as they would like and hence are forced to reduce production and labor demand.
For given parameters, we can show that the initial level of a 0 determines which of the two cases discussed in the previous paragraph arises in equilibrium. Let us focus now on the case where a 0 <â A . To determine k A , note that from the consumption side and labor market equilibrium, we have
Solving for p A and substituting into the budget constraint (17) pins down the number of production units that are kept active during the appreciation:
For a given κ, lower financial resources a 0 reduce the number of production units that are kept open during the appreciation (the right-hand side is increasing in k A ) and lead to more destruction.
Notice, however, that in general equilibrium κ falls as well (see the argument below in 2.3.3) so, in extreme cases, an economy with lower a 0 may end up with a higher level of k A .
Let us now turn to the D region. Starting backwards, once the recovery phase is completed, entrepreneurs consume and φ D,j is equal to 1. Thus, from the first order conditions, we have that in the stationary phase of D:
Eventually, the real exchange rate converges to the benchmark level.
From the equilibrium condition in the labor market and the fact that consumers' demand is lower in the constrained than in the benchmark case (as we show below), it follows that the long run size of the export sector, after the recovery is completed, is:
Since in the constrained economy not only entrepreneurs but also consumers are poorer than in the benchmark economy, demand is depressed and hence the export sector eventually expands to absorb the labor freed by the smaller nontradable sector. However, unlike in the benchmark case, this stationary state is not reached instantly since financial constraints also hamper the recovery phase. The flow of funds constraint and the first order conditions for the transition are:
for j = 0, ..., J, where J is the last period of the transition phase in D and where k D,−1 is equivalent notation for k A .
Equation (18) states that during the recovery phase, firms use all their profits to rebuild the sector. The inequalities in (19) reflect the fact that the financial constraint is tightest early on in the recovery and gradually declines, and hence there is no reason to accumulate "cash" or to consume.
Reorganizing (20), we obtain an expression for the real exchange rate during the transition:
That is, during the recovery phase the depreciation is deeper when the economy is constrained.
We refer to this deeper depreciation as the overshooting implication of financial constraints.
The presence of overshooting means that wages are not only lower than in the benchmark case during the appreciation phase, but also during the transition phase of D. This observation closes our argument, as it explains why consumption levels are lower in the constrained case, given that κ reflects the consumers' lifetime income (see (3)), and that, history by history, the wages p t are smaller than in the first best. 
General Equilibrium Feedback
Our discussion above highlights the export firms' problem for a given consumption demand.
However, firms' actions affect households' income through labor demand. The tighter is the financial constraint on firms, the lower is labor demand and income. This feedback is captured by the relation between a 0 and κ. Figure 4 plots this relation and shows that κ is increasing in a 0 until it reaches its maximum for a 0 ≥â f b (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix).
Note that this general equilibrium feedback generates some counterintuitive results. For example, the model has a sort of sclerosis as a 0 declines. Even though export firms are more financially constrained when financial resources are low, in the long run they absorb a larger share of k. To see this, recall thatk
D which rises as κ drops. This simply says that an economy with poorer consumers allocates a larger share of its resources to satisfy foreign than domestic demand.
Up to now, we have developed a model of equilibrium destruction and overshooting. The next section turns to the other main concern in this paper. In particular, it shows that when a 0 <â f b , the social planner may be able to raise κ by inducing consumers to choose a different path for c N
Optimal Ex-ante and Ex-post Intervention
In the previous section we showed that when the export sector has limited financial resources, the depreciation phase following a persistent appreciation may come with a protracted exchange rate overshooting (a sharp real wage decline) while the export sector rebuilds. Either explicitly or implicitly, in practice it is this overshooting phase that primarily concerns policymakers and leads to a debate on whether intervention should take place during the appreciation phase. In particular, the concern is whether by overly stressing the export sector during the appreciation, the economy may be exposing itself to a costly recovery phase once the factors behind the appreciation subside.
In this section we study this policy problem and conclude that if an overshooting is expected, there is indeed scope for policy intervention. The reason for such intervention is that the competitive equilibrium is not constrained efficient, as consumers ignore the effect of their individual decisions on the severity and duration of the overshooting during the depreciation phase.
The optimal policy includes ex-ante and ex-post interventions. There are instances when the focus of intervention is ex-ante, and the bulk of it consists in stabilizing the exchange rate during the appreciation phase. There are others where the scope for appreciation stabilization is limited and the policy intervention is concentrated in the first period of the depreciation phase (ex-post intervention).
A Fiscal Intervention
We consider a government that uses a set of fiscal instruments to affect the time profile of consumers' demand. In particular, the government can impose a sequence of linear taxes τ T θ t , τ N θ t on consumers' spending on tradables and non-tradables (a negative tax rate corresponds to a subsidy). Any tax revenue is returned to the consumers as a lump-sum transfer at date 0, T 0 , so consumers face the budget constraint
For a given tax sequence τ T θ t , τ N θ t we can define a competitive equilibrium as we did in the economy with no taxes (see Definition 1), replacing the consumers' budget constraint with (21) and adding the condition that the lump-sum transfer T 0 satisfies the government budget balance
We study a benevolent government that chooses τ T θ t , τ N θ t so as to maximize the utility of the representative consumer subject to the constraint of not making entrepreneurs worse off:
where U is the entrepreneurs' expected utility in the competitive equilibrium.
Notice that in this context the choice of linear taxes is not restrictive. The crucial constraint on the set of feasible policies is the condition that no direct transfers can be made between consumers and entrepreneurs. We choose to focus on this exercise for two reasons. First, if the government could implement direct transfers, it would be simple in this economy to undo the effects of the financial constraint (1). The government would transfer resources to the entrepreneurs in the A phase and in the early stage of the D phase, and then transfer resources back to consumers later in the D phase, hence replicating the equilibrium of a frictionless economy. In practice, targeted transfers of this kind take place but are limited by a host of informational and institutional impediments which we do not model here. In this sense, the set of policies that we consider respect the spirit of the financial constraint (1). 10 Second, the policy described is more flexible than the specific forms of macroeconomic interventions that are contemplated in the policy debate. Namely, most proposed interventions are geared towards increasing domestic savings, thus reducing the pressure on the real exchange rate by reducing the demand of both tradables and nontradables. As we will see, our policy-maker will choose not to distort tradable consumption decisions and will only intervene on non-tradable consumption.
In summary, we consider a general form of intervention but stay within the boundaries of a constrained efficiency exercise by ruling out direct transfers between consumers and entrepreneurs.
This choice allows us to identify a basic pecuniary externality, which should play a relevant role in all practical policy proposals that attempt to curb persistent appreciations.
Policy Perturbation and Pecuniary Externality
Before characterizing the optimal policy, let us identify the pecuniary externality by studying the impact of small policy interventions around the competitive equilibrium. Consider a planner that maximizes the consumer's utility
, 10 A "fundamental" view of constraint (1) is that it is impossible to extract payments from entrepreneurs, whether in the form of financial payments or in the form of taxes.
where we have normalized expected utility by the factor (1 − β (1 − δ)). 11 As usual in optimal taxation problems, it is easier to characterize the problem directly in terms of equilibrium quantities, rather than in terms of the underlying tax rates. Thus, we let the planner choose directly the consumption paths for tradables and nontradables. Substituting the government budget balance, the consumers' budget constraint is (also multiplying through by (1 − β (1 − δ))):
Relative to the problem of an individual consumer, the planner's problem is different in that it takes into account the effect of consumers' decisions on p A and {p D,j }. Consumers' decisions affect the equilibrium prices by changing the demand for nontradables and, thus, equilibrium wages. The entrepreneurs' optimality condition and market clearing in the labor market give an equilibrium relation between the quantities chosen by the planner and the prices p A and p D,j .
Namely, the planner chooses the c N A and c N D,j , market clearing gives k A = 1 − c N A and k D,j = 1 − c N D,j , and entrepreneur's optimality gives the associated equilibrium prices. Finally, the constraint that entrepreneurs cannot be made worse off is (also multiplying through by ( 
Let us study the effect of stabilizing the appreciation phase, starting from the competitive equilibrium studied in Section 2. Specifically, consider the effect of reducing c N A or, equivalently, increasing k A , while keeping the k D,j 's unchanged. This change will affect equilibrium prices and thus the net present value of the consumer's income. Suppose the planner adjusts c T A so that the consumer's budget constraint (23) is satisfied.
The following expression captures the marginal effect of a change in k A on the consumer's utility:
where λ = u c T A is the Lagrange multiplier on the consumer's budget constraint in the competitive equilibrium. The first row of (25) captures the direct effect of the policy. It is equivalent to the 11 See the Appendix for a detailed setup of the planner problem. In the Appendix we show that the second best allocation shares the following features with the competitive equilibrium: the consumption of tradables is constant and equal to c T A and c T D , respectively, in the A phase and in the D phase, and the consumption of non-tradables is constant and equal to c N A in the A phase and only depends on j in the D phase. Therefore, also in the perturbation argument we focus directly on allocations with these features.
consumer's first order condition in the competitive economy and so it is equal to zero at the equilibrium allocation. The second row captures the net income effect for the consumer. 12 to carry an extra unit of k A , then p A must drop for the firm to be able to finance the extra losses of that unit. Recall that the firm's budget constraint in phase A is
from which we obtain:
We now turn to the effects of
, there is equilibrium overshooting, the entrepreneur budget constraint at date t D,0 is
The entrepreneur's financial constraint is binding and he uses all his current profits to invest in new units. In this case, a unit increase in k A affects p D,0 since it reduces by f the investment required to rebuild to k D,0 . Wages must rise to compensate for this fall in investment expenditure, so as to keep the financial constraint exactly binding at k D,0 . Thus,
Finally, notice that in the competitive equilibrium c Replacing (26) and (27) in the second row of (25) we have:
The inequality follows from p A < p 
Replacing these terms in (25) we obtain that the effect on the consumer's expected utility is
given that λ < λp A . The consumer would benefit from increasing c N A and reducing k A . The reason is that it makes no sense for consumers to cut their wage today if this action does not raise wages in the future, which it will not when there is no overshooting to remedy and p D,0 is pinned down by the technological free entry condition. Instead, the planner, representing the consumers, would like to exercise its "monopoly" power during the appreciation phase and raise wages by increasing their demand for nontradables. However this increase would reduce the consumption of entrepreneurs, given that ∂c T,e D,0 /∂k A = f , and violate their participation constraint (24) . In fact, when there is no expected overshooting, it is optimal not to intervene. In this case, there exists a Lagrange multiplier µ such that the planner's first order condition for k A takes the form 
Proceeding as we did above for (26) and (26), we get
The inequality follows from the fact that p D,j < p f b
This, together with the consumer's first order condition, implies that a reduction in p D,j leads to a marginal welfare gain.
In the competitive equilibrium, the firms' financial constraint depresses labor demand, making non-tradables cheaper and inducing consumers to demand more of them. The social planner offsets the consumers' reaction to the overshooting and reduces c N D,j (it taxes nontradable consumption). Note that as a result of this reduction in c N D,j the overshooting is exacerbated, but this is precisely what increases profits and allows financially constrained firms to accelerate investment. The trade-off is between a deeper overshooting and lower wages today in exchange for a faster recovery in wages. Because φ D,j > φ D,j+1 , reducing wages at t D,j generates an excess return in export firms that is transferred back to workers in the form of higher wages at t D,j+1 .
Once we allow the planner to set policy optimally in both phases, A and D, some of the incentive to exacerbate the overshooting in the D phase goes away, because the planner can already achieve higher levels of investment by protecting entrepreneurial wealth in the appreciation phase. This interaction between preventive intervention and intervention in the depreciation phase is a central aspect of the optimal policy discussion that follows.
Optimal Policy
We learned from the perturbation argument above that if there is an expected overshooting, then the competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient and there is scope for policy. We now turn to characterizing the economy's dynamics under the optimal policy. Figure 5 plots the real exchange rate and the number of export units in the competitive equilibrium and in the "second best" allocation, in a baseline scenario. 13 The first feature of the optimal policy is that the planner attenuates the exchange rate appreciation. This attenuation has the effect of keeping more export units open in the appreciation phase, and makes the recovery of the export sector faster during the depreciation phase. In turn, the faster recovery increases the demand of non-tradables by entrepreneurs and reduces the extent and duration of the real exchange rate overshooting during the depreciation phase. The final effect of the intervention is a form of real exchange rate stabilization.
Two robust features of the optimal price path are that p A is lower than the competitive equilibrium level, and that the increase in the expected present value of the p D,j 's more than offsets the decline in p A . The price path depicted in Figure 5 also displays a reduction in the initial overshooting at t D,0 . However, this feature is less robust and depends on the economy's initial conditions. We will discuss other possible cases below.
Let us explore the optimal paths in more detail, by analyzing first the intervention in the A phase (i.e., the choice of k A ) and then the intervention in the D phase (i.e., the k D,j 's).
There is an optimal degree of exchange rate stabilization during the A phase. Given that p A < p f b A and p D,0 < p f b D we can substitute (26) and (27) in (25) , simplify, and obtain the planner's first order condition:
The social planner allocates k A as if prices were at first best. In the competitive equilibrium, consumers increase their demand for nontradables in response to the taste shock, which leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. However, due to the firms' financial constraint, the appreciation is smaller than it would be in the first best. This price gap implies that consumers further increase their consumption of nontradables, at the expense of export units. The planner taxes consumption of nontradables enough to offset this additional effect, and in so doing lowers the real exchange rate and allows firms to maintain a larger number of production units open.
Turning to the D phase, notice that along the recovery path the entrepreneurs' financial constraint is exactly binding: 13 The parameters are the same as those used for Figures 2 and 3 . As in those figures, we plot the realized path when the appreciation lasts five periods. The optimal paths are computed using the characterization result in the Appendix (proof of Proposition 6). Entrepreneurs use all their profits for investment and delay their consumption until they have reachedk D (this happens at t = 11 in Figure 5 ). Notice also that some amount of overshooting is still present in the second best, i.e., 
On the other hand, if the planner tried to increase k D,0 , the current wage would drop but there would be no gain in terms of future wages, given that the entrepreneurs' would be unconstrained and would employ the extra funds for consumption. In this case, there would be a benefit in terms of relaxing the entrepreneur's participation constraint and the marginal effect would be
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier on the entrepreneur's participation constraint. 14 The two conditions just derived show that the planner is at a 'kink,' where neither decreasing nor increasing k D,0 leads to an improvement. Notice that the reasoning behind these conditions applies only be-
D for all the periods following t D,0 . This is key since it shows that under the optimal policy, the overshooting can only happen in the first period of the recovery. If we had p D,j < p f b D in some other period, then in the previous period it would be optimal to increase k D,j−1 and accelerate the adjustment towardk D . Essentially, the optimal path requires that if the planner wants to allow for some depreciation in the D phase to speed up the recovery, it completely frontloads this depreciation.
In terms of consumption of non-tradables, a distortion is also concentrated in the early periods of the D phase (although, not only in the first period). In these periods the following inequality holds,
which can be derived in same way as (30). An individual consumer would like to decrease his consumption of nontradables (i.e., increase k D,j ). However, since the entrepreneurs financial constraint is exactly binding, increasing k D,j in any of these periods would reduce the current wages, Let us briefly discuss the role of the assumptions on φ ce A and k ce A . The first assumption is made for simplicity, as it ensures that the planner can disregard the constraint p D,j ≥ 0. 15 The second assumption is made to rule out the extreme case discussed in 2.3.2, where the wealth effect on consumers is so large that the constrained equilibrium displays less destruction than the first best. 16 For completeness, note that in terms of quantities the optimal policy reduces the fluctuations in k and the long run size of the export sector. The former result is just the counterpart of exchange rate stabilization. The reason for the latter result is that consumers are richer in the "second best,"
and hence use a larger share of their labor resources to produce nontradables. To illustrate this wealth effect, Figure 6 compares the value of κ in the competitive equilibrium and the "second best," for different levels of financial resources in the export sector, a 0 . As expected, for high values of a 0 the competitive equilibrium is close to the second best (and they coincide for a 0 ≥â D ), which in turn is closer to the first best. However, for low levels of a 0 , the pecuniary externality is significant and the second best income is substantially higher than that of the competitive equilibrium. Of course, if the government had effective direct transfer instruments, then by increasing a 0 it would be able not only to narrow the wedge between the competitive equilibrium and the second best, but also that between the latter and the first best.
Ex-ante versus Ex-post Intervention
In our discussion of the optimal policy, we touched on a pervasive policy concern in the presence of an appreciation in the value of the currency or of any other asset with potential macroeconomic consequences (e.g., real estate or stocks). Should the intervention take place ex-ante (i.e., during the appreciation phase) or ex-post (i.e., after the "crash" or depreciation takes place)? Here we study the timing of the intervention in terms of when is it optimal to keep the real exchange rate (and thus the wage rate) below its first best level. 17 In the example we used in Figure 5 , the optimal policy involved a combination of both, that is, the exchange rate was kept below its first best level both during the appreciation phase and in the early periods of the depreciation. The planner stabilized the exchange during the appreciation, 15 The characterization can be easily extended to the case φ ce
In that case, the optimal path may involve a real exchange rate equal to zero for the first period(s) of the D phase. The overshooting is still frontloaded to the early periods of D, but may last more than one period. 16 See the discussion on page 14. The condition holds in all the examples presented (and in all reasonable parametrizations we have looked at). 17 An alternative would be to look at the timing of the taxes used to implement the planner's allocation and distinguish ex ante vs ex post intervention in terms of when non-zero taxes are imposed. Here we prefer to focus on the distortion of the real exchange rate as it closely matches the welfare rationale for intervention. In any event, as we shall see below, our setup also implies that a combination of ex ante and ex post taxes is, in general, necessary to implement the constrained efficient allocation. In contrast, panel (a) of Figure 7 represents a case in which the intervention to offset the pecuniary externality is entirely done ex-ante. 18 An attenuation of the appreciation in A, by increasing 
while an increase in k A gives 19
In this case, the optimal values of k A and p A are determined by the entrepreneurs' participation constraint. 18 Parameters are the same as those used for In fact, the latter is significantly reduced in this case. However, as a 0 rises there is less scope for ex-ante intervention and a larger share of the adjustment is deferred to the depreciation phase.
Eventually, when a 0 is sufficiently large, the policy is mostly concentrated ex-post, even to the point of causing an over-overshooting (the region where the dashed line is below the solid line in the bottom panel). Finally, as a 0 is sufficiently high that there is no overshooting in the competitive equilibrium, there is no longer scope for policy.
In terms of implementation of the optimal policy in each of these scenarios, Figure 9 reports the paths of nontradable consumption taxes, τ N , corresponding to the three panels in Figure 7 .
The pure ex-ante policy in panel (a) requires strictly positive taxes during the appreciation phase and a subsidy during the depreciation phase. That is, the ex-ante aspect of the policy refers to the fact that the pecuniary externality is entirely resolved during the appreciation phase. The subsidy component of the policy is simply a mechanism by which, through higher wages consumers 
Further Considerations for Intervention
In this section we briefly discuss three important considerations for intervention: The persistence of the appreciation, distortions in consumers' perceptions, and frictions in the nontradables sector.
Appreciation Persistence
In our complete markets context, persistence matters only in an ex-ante sense and is captured by the parameter δ. On one extreme, if δ is close to one (very short lived appreciations) then the losses to be financed are not much and entrepreneurs' internal resources may suffice. On the other extreme, if δ is very close to zero (very persistent appreciations), then the option value of keeping (1/δ, a 0 ) space. The shaded region corresponds to the case where the equilibrium is constrained inefficient and exchange rate intervention is warranted. Note that there are many general equilibrium effects hidden in this figure. For example, as δ changes, so does κ. Also, when δ rises, firms reluctance to destroy during the appreciation rises. This reluctance exacerbates the (now shorter lived) appreciation, and hence the resources required to survive each period of appreciation. However, none of these additional effects is strong enough to change the qualitative shape of the figure and the conclusion that follows from it. Medium run appreciations are most likely to justify intervention. 21 
Consumers' Overoptimism and Incomplete Insurance
In reality, consumption binges rarely occur by themselves. In the international context, they often come as a response to a rise in national income due to a positive terms of trade shock in 21 In an earlier draft we relaxed the complete markets assumption and studied the polar opposite case, where export firms only have access to a riskless bond. In this context, the export sector resources dwindle as the appreciation progresses. The main policy implication that follows from this modification is the timing of the exchange rate stabilization in the appreciation phase. Early on in the appreciation, the optimal policy is to postpone much of the intervention to the D phase. However, as the appreciation continues and the export sector's resources dwindle, the optimal policy shifts a larger share of the intervention to the appreciation phase (essentially, this amounts to a gradual leftward movement in Figure 8 .) commodity producing countries, or due to a large increase in the supply of capital flows to the country. Adding external income shocks to our complete markets, rational representative agent setup, would have no effect on the path of consumption, given that consumers fully insure against these shocks. We need to add some "friction" on the consumption side as well.
One extension along these lines is to replace the taste shocks with income (terms of trade)
shocks, but assume that either foreigners charge an insurance premium to consumers, or that the latter are overoptimistic with respect to the expected duration of the high income phase A: 22
In either case, consumers find D-insurance too expensive and choose not to insure fully. The analysis is more complex in this case since incomplete insurance introduces wealth and price dynamics within the appreciation phase, however the important point for us is that the basic structure of our environment is preserved. In particular, nontradables demand drops at the time of the switch and consumers still ignore the pecuniary externality associated to their high expenditure during the appreciation. Of course, if the social planner does not share in the consumers' optimism, then it would be justified to implement some sort of saving policy, with the goal of reducing not only c N A but also c T A . More importantly, even if the planner does share consumers' view on the expected duration of the appreciation, there is a role for intervention to offset the pecuniary externality, as in our main case.
Rigidities in the Nontradables Sector
Frictions in the nontradable sector generally shift a share of the intervention toward the A phase. Another example is the presence of a real wage rigidity, either as the result of a distortion or of a reservation wage. 23 Yet another is that some of the inputs of production in the nontradables sector are tradables. 22 Alternatively, we could introduce procyclical consumption (or short horizons) through non-representative agents.
The extreme version of this formulation is one where consumers live for only one period and must consume their income in that period. The social planner Pareto-weighs a generation t periods from the current one by β t . If no intergenerational transfer mechanism other than through the real exchange rate is available, then we are again in the situation just described. The constrained goal of the social planner is to reallocate consumption away from non-tradables during the appreciation phase. Relative to the pure taste shock scenario, a larger share of the adjustment is done in the A phase, in order to reduce the burden of the adjustment on the first generation in the D phase. 23 See Blanchard (2006b) for a more thorough discussion of wage rigidities and appreciations; and Blanchard (2006a) for an application to the case of Portugal.
Let us develop the simplest of these examples and assume that workers have a reservation wage of w units of tradable goods, which is not binding except, possibly, during the overshooting phase. Suppose that this reservation wage is binding for the optimal policy but not for the competitive equilibrium. That is, in the over-overshooting scenario the social planner would like to bring p sb D,0 below w, but it cannot. What is the impact of this binding constraint on the optimal policy? In particular, how much of the intervention is reallocated to the appreciation phase? Let us return to the complete markets environment to answer the latter question. We know that in this context the social planner's first order condition in the A phase is:
It follows immediately that p sb,w A < p sb A , where p sb,w A and p sb A stand for the second best real exchange rate during the appreciation with and without a reservation wages w, respectively. The reason for the inequality is that the binding constraint must necessarily lower κ relative to the unconstrained case, and this implies that λ = u (θ A κ) rises with the constraint. In turn, the latter implies that k A increases, which given the firms financial constraint can only be achieved with a larger intervention that drops the real exchange rate below that of the unconstrained case.
Final Remarks
This paper shows how financial frictions lend support to the view that persistent appreciations may justify intervention, even if agents are fully rational and forward looking. The reason for the intervention is not to improve the health of the export sector per se, as our social planner is primarily concerned about consumers (workers), but a pecuniary externality within consumers.
By putting excessive cost pressure on financially constrained export firms during the appreciation phase, consumers reduce these firms' ability to recover once the factors behind the appreciation subside. The result is a severe overshooting and real wage collapse at that stage, which hurts consumers more than they gain from the extra consumption during the appreciation.
Our normative framework sheds light on the perennial policy problem of the timing of intervention. We show that, other things equal, if financial constraints on the export sector are tight during the appreciation phase, then it is optimal to intervene ex-ante. Conversely, if the export sector has substantial financial resources (although not enough to fully finance the recovery), then ex-ante intervention is either costly or ineffective, and it is optimal to postpone intervention until after the "crash."
In abstract, the optimal policy can be implemented through an appropriate sequence of taxes and subsidies on nontradable consumption. In reality, the flexibility of such policies is limited, leaving to expenditure policy and central bank's reserves management most of the burden. While these are not perfect substitutes for taxes and subsidies, much of our insights still carry over to them.
Let us conclude with a few clarifying remarks and extensions. When thinking about policy, it is worth noting the distinction between an "appreciation" and an "overvaluation." The latter is an elusive concept in practice but it has a well defined meaning in ours: an overvaluation refers to a situation where the exchange rate is higher than it is socially optimal. However, this gap is not limited to an appreciation episode as it can also take place during a depreciation phase.
The over-overshooting result is an example of an overvaluation during the depreciation phase. A wage rigidity is an example of when such overvaluation cannot be cured fully with intervention within the depreciation phase. The latter example also illustrates the role of early intervention in limiting future overvaluations.
We note that our model uses a single reason -a financial friction-for constrained production in the appreciation and depreciation phases. However, some of our conclusions extend to other scenarios as well. In particular, we could replace the financial constraint in the depreciation phase for a technological time to build assumption. In such case, the overshooting is also directly linked to excessive export destruction in the appreciation phase and there is a reason for intervention.
The main difference in this instance is that the optimal policy does not prolong the intervention into the depreciation phase.
Finally, while our analysis focuses on the real exchange rate, it seems suitable for other important relative prices within an economy. For example, a real estate boom can have important cost consequences for sectors that compete with the construction sector for inputs and factors of production. More broadly, ours is a model of the optimal management of sectoral reallocation in the presence of temporary (but persistent) shocks, when some sectors have limited financial and technological flexibility.
where the inequality in the middle follows from assumption (A3).
where the inequality in the middle follows from
(the second inequality follows from (A3)). Therefore, Lemma 1 implies that k D,0 > k A . In a similar way, it is possible to prove that (36) implies k D,j ≥ k D,j−1 for each j. From these two steps we obtain a sequence p A , p D,j , which can then be substituted in expression (3), to obtain κ . This defines a map T : 0, κ f b → 0, κ f b .
Step 2. It can be shown that the map T is continuous. Furthermore, let us prove that κ = T (κ (1 + ∆)) < (1 + ∆) T (κ) .
In the construction in Step 1, an increase in κ leads to a (weak) reduction in k A and k D,j for all j (for the initial conditions of phase D notice that if (32) is satisfied, then, using the definition of p f b
A , it is possible to show that a D,0 + f k A is independent of κ; if (32) is not satisfied, then an increase in κ leads to a decrease in k A ). But since k A = 1 − θ A κ/p A , k D,j = 1 − κ/p D,j , this implies that the prices p A and p D,j must increase less than proportionally than κ. Therefore, κ increases less than proportionally.
Step 3. Define the following map for z ≡ log (κ) : z =T (z) ≡ log (T (exp z )) .
Step 2 shows that this map is continuous and has slope smaller than 1. Therefore this map has a unique fixed point (uniqueness is not needed for the statement of this proposition, but will be useful for the following results). Let κ be the fixed point and consider the prices and quantities constructed in Step 1. To ensure that they are an equilibrium, it remains to check that the sequence of prices and quantities are optimal for the entrepreneur. Derive the marginal utility of money at t D,0 from the recursion: A . Notice that as long as a 0 <â f b either p A or some p D,j will be strictly below their first best value. Therefore, φ A > 1.
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4
The following lemma provides a useful preliminary result.
Lemma 2
The equilibrium value of κ is non-decreasing in a 0 .
Proof. Let T (κ; a 0 ) be the mapping 0, κ f b → 0, κ f b defined in the proof of Proposition 2, indexed by the initial wealth a 0 . Choose two values a 0 < a 0 . Let κ and κ be the corresponding equilibrium values of κ. Now, fixing κ we want to show that T is monotone in a 0 , i.e., T (κ ; a 0 ) ≥ T (κ ; a 0 ). If (32) holds at a 0 , then an increase in a 0 leaves p A unchanged, and it increases a D,0 (from (33)) and leaves k A unchanged.
If (32) does not hold, an increase in a D,0 leads to an increase in p A , and an increase in a D,0 + f k A , since a D,0 either remains zero or becomes positive and k A increases. In both cases, a D,0 + f k A increases. This means that, in phase D, there will be a (weak) increase in k D,j for all j, and, thus, a (weak) increase in p D,j for all j.
Therefore, T (κ ; a 0 ) ≥ T (κ ; a 0 ) = κ . This implies that T (κ; a 0 ) has a fixed point in [κ , κ f b ]. Since T has a unique fixed point and T (κ ; a 0 ) = κ , by construction, this implies κ ≥ κ . 
Setup of the Optimal Policy Problem
The set of feasible allocations is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Feasibility) The allocation {c T θ t , c N θ t , c T,e θ t , k θ t } is feasible iff there exists a sequence of tax rates τ T θ t , τ N θ t , wealth levels a θ t , and prices p θ t , q θ t such that the prices and quantities p θ t , q θ t and {c T θ t , c N θ t , c T,e θ t , k θ t , a θ t } constitute a competitive equilibrium under the tax rates τ T θ t , τ N θ t . 
Rearranging these conditions shows that a sufficient condition for an optimum is that there exist La-
and conditions (48)-(51) are satisfied.
Proof of Propositions 5 and 6
We prove Proposition 6 by giving a complete characterization of the optimal allocation. The proof is split in three steps. In the first step, we define two maps J andJ. In the second step, we use these maps to construct a candidate optimal allocation and we show that this allocation is indeed optimal. The proof of 5 is a side product of this step. In the third step, we derive the implications for the optimal path of the exchange rate and for the optimal tax in A.
Step 
where p D,0 = 1 − f + δβ 2 f 2 / φ ce A (p A − 1) , and the sequence k A , k D,j is given by
k D,0 = Given the construction of the sequence k * A , k * and φ * D,j = 1 for all j ≥ 1. These, can be used to check that entrepreneur's behavior is optimal, i.e. that (10) and (11) 
